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In the wake of the Financial Crisis of 2008, the 
huge Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, and 
other industrial catastrophes, the media and 
academic journals are now replete with charges of 
that industries have captured their regulators. 
There are well-documented reports of constantly 
revolving doors in which the regulators and the 
regulated frequently change places, of huge 
amounts spent by industries in lobbying both 
legislators and regulators, and of close social 
relationships that exist between senior regulators 
and executives. A recent Bloomberg 
BusinessWeek profile   describes   the   “chummy  
relationship”   between   the   chairman  of   Citigroup,  
Dick Parsons, and the Secretary of the United 
States Treasury, Timothy Geithner, whom Parsons 
apparently   calls   “Timmy”   – a term that one 
leading   Wall   Street   analyst   observes   ‘does   not  
exactly acknowledge the authority of the 
Secretary, a post once occupied by Alexander 
Hamilton’.1 
                                                 
1 Mayo, M. (2012). Exile on Wall Street:  One Analysts Fight to 
Save the Big Banks From Themselves. Hoboken, N.J. Wiley. It 
is perhaps worth noting that the same profile observes that 
Parsons   ‘also   got   along   well   with   [Comptroller   of   the  
Currency,   John]   Dugan,   whom   Parsons   calls   a   “good   guy”.  
Leonard,   D.   (2011).   ‘Dick   Parsons,   Captain   Emergency’,  
Sometimes it seems almost as if the United States 
Treasury (not to mention the staff of the White 
House itself) is run by a cadre of officials who 
were either recently members of Goldman Sachs 
or who had spent most of their waking hours 
interacting with the CEOs of Goldman, JP Morgan, 
Citi and other New York banking giants. One might 
be excused for assuming that the atmosphere 
between Big Finance and its regulators more 
accurately resembles the congeniality of an 
                                                                             
Bloomberg Businessweek, 24.03.2011, available online at 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_14/b4
222084044889.htm. 
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exclusive club than the formal relationship 
between regulators and a powerful industry. One 
might then also reasonably wonder whether such 
“chums”   might   treat   each   other   rather   more  
favourably than strangers2. 
 
“Capture”   has   therefore   become   a   prominent  
element in public policy debates on financial 
regulation. As a theory of private distortion of 
public purpose, the concept seems important for 
diagnosing regulatory failures culminating in the 
2008 Financial Crisis (Crisis) and for lessons on 
how to prevent future crises. The capture of 
financial regulators by elements of the financial 
industry is now often offered to explain why 
regulators did not take apparently obvious action 
to curb excessive industry practices that might 
have contributed to the Crisis, and as a reason for 
delayed implementation and substantial dilution 
of rules designed to reform the financial system.   
 
Capture:  an elusive concept 
 
“Regulatory   capture”   has   long played an 
important role in efforts to explain alleged 
regulatory failure. Suggesting that one interest 
group among many in a field contesting for 
recognition of their disparate interests has seized 
control of the umpires, such that the game is no 
longer taking place on a level playing field, or that 
regulatory systems are even created by a strong 
interest group in order to stifle competition, 
capture is used by proponents of both regulation 
and deregulation to make their case. In a world of 
giant financial institutions, powerful chief 
executives, and huge bonuses despite poor 
financial performance, it seems that capture is to 
blame, one way or the other. For those in favour 
of   more   regulation,   the   industry’s   ability   to  
influence regulators must be curbed.  For those in 
favour of less regulation, one of the reasons for 
reducing regulatory influence is to prevent 
favoritism by captured regulators.  
 
                                                 
2 See  Johnson,  S.  (2009).  ‘The  Quiet  Coup.’ The Atlantic, May, 
and Johnson, S. and J. Kwak (2010). 13 Bankers: The Wall 
Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown.  New York, 
Pantheon Books. 
Capture is a perplexing concept when invoked in 
any area of economic regulation. It is frequently 
misdiagnosed because  critics   ‘leap   from  an  event  
(however embarrassing) to make large-scale 
inferences   about   an   agency’s   entire   culture’,   and  
it is often mistreated because   ‘there is far too 
much fatalism – some of it strategic, no doubt – 
about the possibility of ameliorating capture or 
even   preventing   it’3.  The concept is generally 
problematic because it is at once a theory of 
legislative and regulatory motivation and a 
vituperative accusation levelled at results 
unfavorable to one of the contesting groups, even 
if those results might indeed strike the right 
balance among competing interests – “we   wuz  
robbed”,   as  many   a   losing   boxer   and   his   trainer  
have grumbled at the end of a fight. The 
accusation is likely to be made even if the actual 
result was the right one, or one that was 
inevitable given the legislative mandate under 
which the regulator is operating. 
 
Capture might also manifest itself in various 
forms, ranging from the blatant (for example, 
where an official is bribed to make a decision) to 
the   more   nuanced   types   of   ‘deep’   or   ‘cultural’  
capture that involve a consanguinity among elite 
classes of regulators and executives4. In the latter 
situation, regulators and executives might share 
similar backgrounds, traditions, understandings of 
the markets and fundamental philosophies, talk to 
each other frequently and almost exclusively, 
share implicit understandings; the quintessential 
“old   boys’   club”.   Thus   an   appearance   of  
impartiality on the part of a regulator might belie 
an inherent bias that, in various subtle ways, 
systematically favours that part of the industry 
with which the regulator most closely identifies.  
 
                                                 
3 Carpenter,   D.   &   D.   Moss   (2012).   ‘Introduction.’   Draft  
chapter (as of 28.10.11) in: Carpenter and Moss, eds 
(forthcoming). Preventing Regulatory Capture:  Special 
Interest Influence, and How to Limit It. 
4 Hanson J & Yosifon D, (2003), The Situation: An Introduction 
to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power 
Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review. 129, 202–84;   Kwak   (forthcoming).   ‘Cultural  
Capture   and   the   Financial   Crisis’,   Draft   chapter   (as   of  
24.10.11) in: Carpenter, D. and D. Moss, eds (forthcoming). 
Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence, 
and How to Limit It. 
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Capture in financial regulation 
 
When one starts to apply the notion of capture to 
financial regulation, the concept becomes more 
problematic than ever. In the United States (US), 
for example, additional elements bedevil the 
analysis.   
 
There are various kinds of financial regulators. 
Some, for example the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (OCC), are specifically directed to 
favour the industry they charter. The OCC is a 
prestigious agency within the Treasury 
Department founded back in 1863 primarily to 
create and propagate a national (or federal) 
banking system, which was intended to smother 
the chaotic state-chartered system that had 
enjoyed a monopoly in US banking after the 
demise of the Second Bank of the United States 
(1836). National banks, in the words of the US 
Supreme  Court   in   1873,   are   ‘national   favourites’.  
Though seldom expressed in such blunt terms, the 
growth and prosperity of the national banking 
system continues to be vigorously promoted by 
the OCC as a part of its implicit mandate under the 
National Bank Act. State-chartered banks, the 
tenacious counterparts to national banks, also 
continue to survive under the aegis of their own 
state chartering agencies. Bank holding companies 
have likewise enjoyed considerable protection by 
the agency directly responsible for approving their 
formation and promoting their prosperity, the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(Fed). As we saw during the Crisis, both the Fed 
and the Treasury make no bones about the fact 
that when financial stability is threatened they 
consider it their first duty to protect the banks 
from failure in order to preserve the entire 
financial system. It is often declared that the 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 has put an 
end to the notion that any financial institution will 
be considered too big to fail, but few believe that 
this is really how the Act will be applied in another 
crisis.  
 
Quite   apart   from   these   “chartering”   agencies,  
there are other important kinds of financial 
regulators, such as the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB), the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and state 
insurance commissioners. Each has a different 
specific mission. The FDIC acts as manager and 
protector of the federal deposit insurance funds, 
and as receiver for banks and systemically 
important holding companies and non-bank 
financial institutions when they fail. The CFPB acts 
as a market umpire to protect consumers from 
improper financial products and promote proper 
market disclosures. The SEC and CFTC protect the 
overall transparency and integrity of the 
securities, futures and derivatives markets. State 
insurance commissioners regulate the insurance 
activities of the financial companies, no matter 
how large. These various agencies have often 
taken differing positions, sometimes in direct 
opposition to each other or to the Fed or the OCC. 
Very public examples of such clashes range from 
disputes over the reporting of loan loss reserves, 
the eligibility of trust preferred securities as 
appropriate components of capital, and the ability 
of a holding company to shelter its derivatives 
business inside its insured bank subsidiary. In this 
respect the regulatory fragmentation of the US 
system, far from being the chaotic structure for 
which it is often criticized, provides some of the 
“factional”   elements   that   James   Madison   in   the  
Federalist No. 10 considered so important for 
generating a sound result through partisan 
competition. So, although the public focus tends 
to be on the Fed and the Treasury, it is not self-
evident exactly whom has been captured or how 
the captured agency might be able to act in the 
face of powerful conflicting regulatory interests 
without being exposed for improper bias. With 
this regulatory array it would be difficult in 
practice for any particular sector of the industry to 
secure the comprehensive capture of financial 
regulators. 
 
The problem with capture as an analytical concept 
in financial regulation goes even deeper. Capture 
presupposes the competition of clearly 
delineated, divergent interests in which one 
stakeholder seizes control or exerts improper 
influence over the regulatory arbiters who are 
meant to be upholding an objective public 
interest. This idea might make some sense in the 
case of market regulators, such as the SEC, CFTC 
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and CFPB, where the regulatory structure assumes 
a division between public (regulatory) action and 
private (industry and consumer) interests, in 
which the former strikes a balance over the 
contesting claims of the latter. But is this really an 
accurate depiction of the structure of financial 
markets and their relationship to financial 
regulators? 
It is true that the activities of private market 
participants require financing and that this 
financing has generally come from non-
governmental lenders and investors. In this 
respect banks have perhaps always been 
“private”.  However,  in  performing  a  critical  role  in  
government finance the largest banks have also 
long  possessed  a  “quasi-public”  character  even  as  
“private”   entities. The system of national banks 
created by the US National Bank Act of 1863 was 
deliberately created to establish a national 
currency and provide financing to a severely cash-
strapped federal government during the Civil War. 
For this reason, the courts recognized national 
banks  to  be  not  only  ‘national  favourites’  but  also  
‘instrumentalities   of   the   state’5. Such status had 
also earlier been extended to the First and Second 
Banks of the United States, which operated under 
direct congressional charters as quasi-central 
banks and this recognition took place long before 
the creation of a US central banking system in 
1913. 
 
These entities enjoyed quasi-public status because 
of the public functions they perform. Most 
important is their role as transmission belts of 
monetary policy, through which the central bank 
manages the money supply. They also play a 
central role as primary dealers and investors in 
huge volumes of public debt. Dealing and 
investing in government debt has long received 
privileged regulatory treatment, exemption from 
the prohibitions otherwise placed on US banks 
against dealing and investing in private equity (the 
Glass-Steagall wall) and, when it comes to US 
government obligations, even from the 
prohibition against proprietary trading under the 
                                                 
5 Baxter,   L.G.   (2012).   ‘Betting   Big:   Value,   Caution   and  
Accountability  in  an  Era  of  Large  Banks  and  Complex  Finance’,  
Review of Banking and Finance Law, 31 (Fall 2012, 
forthcoming) 
Volcker Rule. In addition, banks in the US are also 
critically important repositories for other failing 
financial institutions in situations where 
government simply lacks the resources to 
liquidate those institutions.  Vivid examples of this 
“receivership”   role are the acquisitions of Bear 
Sterns and Washington Mutual by JP Morgan 
Chase and of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America 
during the Crisis in 20086. 
 
These public roles are important: they imply that 
large  banks,  despite  the  “private  market”  rhetoric,  
are semi-public institutions. In this context 
capture can become a confusing concept. After all, 
if banks perform public functions, why would 
there not be capture – perhaps even in both 
directions? Intense bank-regulatory influence 
would seem to be essential for the proper 
discharge of the quasi-public functions described. 
Capture, from this perspective, is simply inevitable 
and may be to a certain extent actually desirable. 
We do want exchanges of expertise in 
complicated areas of financial regulation. We do 
want experts as regulators, and regulatory experts 
as financial executives. We depend on constant 
interaction between the industry and regulators; 
indeed, bank supervision would be hard to 
imagine without it. And we would want some 
degree of coordination between government and 
banks for the implementation of monetary policy 
and the maintenance of financial stability. 
 
Addressing capture with institutions and 
processes 
 
If   this   view   is   correct,   then   the   “problem   of  
capture”   in   financial   regulation   might   be   better 
reframed in less tendentious terms. Some degree 
of capture is surely inevitable. If capture is 
understood as becoming undesirable when the 
degree of influence by one legitimate stakeholder 
in the regulatory process over another has 
become unbalanced, then avoiding or reducing 
the distortions created by capture – that is, 
disproportionate industry influence – becomes 
essentially a question of promoting principles for 
maintaining transparency and accountability. 
Because they focus on a systemic process, no 
                                                 
6 Ibid 
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single solution is likely to prevent distortions on its 
own. 
 
These principles can be grouped into five general 
categories: adequate regulatory capacity; 
meaningful transparency; meaningful access by 
stakeholders; external checks; and internal checks.   
 
1. Adequate regulatory capacity 
 
Americans treat regulators rather badly. Financial 
regulators are underpaid relative to the market 
for their skills; they are also the first to be blamed 
when congressional and presidential policies fail. 
Sometimes regulators deserve castigation but very 
often they are placed in the impossible position of 
having to carry out grossly ambitious, whipsawing 
and often incoherent legislative and executive 
mandates with inadequate resources. The recent 
huge extension by the Dodd-Frank Act to their 
regulatory mandate, followed by subsequent 
denials of congressional funding, provides a clear 
example  of   the   regulator’s  predicament.  Basically 
this is because, despite a general American 
acceptance of the importance of regulation,7 the 
most effective short-term political strategy is to 
treat regulation as if it is a fundamentally 
illegitimate intrusion into a preordained free 
market. Of course this view is both historically and 
functionally absurd, but it is much easier to sell in 
the sound bites of Disneyworld economics and 
election year politics. 
 
America also has a complicated regulatory 
framework that would have delighted cartoonists 
Heath Robinson and Rube Goldberg. This 
ramshackle regulatory structure is often criticized 
as a source of regulatory confusion, buck-passing 
and failure. My personal view is that this concern 
is overblown: there are many ways to structure 
sound regulatory institutions, and the US 
economy is massive enough to justify a 
multiplicity of specialized agencies. Perhaps it is 
just as well they are sometimes at odds with each 
other.  
                                                 
7 Kwak,   J.   (2012b).   ‘Americans  Like  Regulation.’  The Baseline 
Scenario, 13.03.2012, available online at 
http://baselinescenario.com/2012/03/13/americans-like-
regulation/   
Instead, the more important factors for ensuring 
adequate regulatory capacity are that: 
 
(i) the missions of the agencies be clearly 
defined and coordinated;  
(ii) the regulatory agencies be adequately 
funded;  
(iii) regulators be properly incentivized 
through public funds, not promises of 
ultimate private reward from those they 
regulate;  
(iv) regulators possess or can obtain expertise 
that understands the businesses they 
regulate; and  
(v) regulators be rotated, just like executives 
in good companies, so that they do not 
develop too narrow a focus of their 
responsibilities or too close an affinity 
with those they regulate.   
 
All of these factors for regulatory adequacy are, of 
course, easier said than done. In financial services, 
pay disparities between regulators and the 
industry are particularly acute, notwithstanding 
the somewhat higher salaries paid by the financial 
agencies8. Other forms of incentives, such as 
enhanced status and special appeals to public 
minded recruits, might be important9.   
 
Unfortunately an obstacle is that public hostility 
toward regulators seems to be getting worse, not 
better, as election year rhetoric surrounding 
budget cuts intensifies. Yet the trade-off is as 
obvious as it is inevitable: the less resource 
capacity the regulators possess, the more 
dependent they will have to be on the industry 
they supervise10. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Philippon,   T.   and   A.   Reshef   (2008).   ‘Wages   and   Human  
Capital in the U.S. Financial Industry:  1909-2006.’   NBER  
Working Paper, No. 13405. 
9 Baxter,  L.  G.  (2011).  ‘  “Capture”  in  Financial  Regulation:    Can  
We  Channel  it  Toward  the  Common  Good?’  Cornell  Journal  of  
Law and Public Policy, 21(1): 175-200. 
10 McCarty,   N.   (2012).   ‘Complexity,   Capacity   and   Capture’,  
Draft chapter (as of 07.13.11) in: Carpenter, D. and D. Moss, 
eds (forthcoming). Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special 
Interest Influence in Regulation and How to Limit It. 
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2. Meaningful transparency 
 
Adequate input by all significant stakeholders is 
required by the principle of participatory 
democracy and is surely vital for developing 
informed policy and its accurate implementation 
under the circumstances of the market and the 
industry. Given the extremely technical nature of 
finance and the close relationship between 
banking and government, it is natural that 
industry and regulators will develop very close 
associations. This closeness surely distorts 
perceptions over time and inevitably precludes 
consideration of other interests that ought also be 
placed in balance.   
 
Various tools and techniques exist or have been 
proposed for promoting a proper balance. 
Sunlight through transparency – that Brandeisian 
‘best   of   disinfectants’11 – remains as sound as 
ever. Bankers resist transparency for various 
reasons.  They are practised in strictly protecting 
client confidentiality and they do not want to 
share information that might be useful to 
competitors. Together with central bankers they 
also fear that disclosure would reveal financial 
institution dependence on liquidity supports, and 
that this knowledge would be misunderstood by 
the markets and lead to runs on institutions and 
perhaps even to general financial instability.   
 
These arguments against transparency are 
dubious.  The first – protecting client 
confidentiality – is usually not endangered when 
detailed but anonymized bank information is 
disclosed, and if a client position is so large that it 
would be recognized this information is usually 
known to the market anyway. The second – 
protecting information from competitors – is no 
more important than in any other industry, so it is 
unclear why banks should enjoy a special privilege 
in this regard. And the third – protecting the 
market from misunderstanding the liquidity needs 
of banks – seems really to have ended up 
protecting the central bank and financial 
                                                 
11 Brandeis,   L.   (1913).   ‘What   Publicity   Can   Do’,   Harper’s  
Weekly, Dec. 20, 1913, available at: 
http://www.law.louiville.edu/library/collections/brandeis/no
de/196.  
institutions from political and shareholder 
accountability more than preserving financial 
stability. For example, the Fed fought tooth and 
nail to resist Freedom of Information Act demands 
by two news media for disclosures relating to its 
emergency lending during and soon after the 
Crisis. When disclosure was finally forced, the 
information proved very embarrassing for both 
domestic and foreign financial institutions and the 
Fed   itself.   Had   the   Fed’s   actions   been   known  
during the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
different policy choices might well have been 
made, both regarding the support powers of the 
Fed and the permissible scale and operations of 
financial institutions. 
 
The greater transparency imposed on the Fed by 
Dodd-Frank has helped produce more informed 
views on financial regulatory policy. Basel II and III 
also strive to promote greater disclosure to the 
markets. Additionally, more rigorous disclosure 
requirements could help prevent biased decision 
making that might arise from the revolving door 
between regulators and their industry. Greater 
disclosure all round would at least enable other 
stakeholders and the media to focus a spotlight on 
improper collusion. 
 
3. Realistic stakeholder access 
 
Participatory democracy also implies meaningful 
access to the process of regulation by all 
legitimate stakeholders. In the financial world this 
problem is particularly acute because financial 
institutions possess immense influence by reason 
of their size, resources and lobbying power. There 
is a strong argument for correcting this imbalance 
through devices and institutions that strengthen 
the ability of other stakeholders – customers, 
smaller financial institutions, specific niche 
industries, and so on – to represent their interests 
and be properly heard and responded to by the 
agencies that are charged with recognizing and 
protecting their interests. 
 
Such correctives can take various forms. General 
public comment during the rulemaking process is 
one important vehicle but, as scholars have 
demonstrated, business comment appears to have 
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much more influence than private inputs12. When 
it comes to the highly technical dimensions of 
financial regulation, such as working out the 
details of the Volcker Rule, the collective action 
problems for the general public seem particularly 
profound. Their mass action comments are often 
composed of little more than worthless form 
letters13. Industry input is much better organized 
and informed, and because of this it is also much 
more influential.   
 
There are other possibilities. Ayres and 
Braithwaite   propose   a   model   of   ‘tripartism’,   in  
which non-industry groups would have full access 
to all the information before regulators, a seat at 
the negotiating table during the dealmaking 
process, and standing to sue or prosecute that is 
equal to that of the regulator itself14. Another 
approach might be to use a model from public 
utility regulation, where utility regulators in many 
jurisdictions are expressly charged by their 
authorizing legislation to consider and uphold the 
public interest. In some situations this role is 
institutionalized by the specific creation of a 
representative of the public interest who is 
engaged in the decision making process. A 
potential model for applying tripartism in financial 
services regulation can perhaps also be found in 
insurance regulation, where some states have 
developed proxy advocates for supporting the 
public interest in regulatory proceedings15.  
                                                 
12 Yackee J & Yackee S (2006).  A Bias Toward Business?  
Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128 and 
Yackee  S   (2012).   “Reconsidering   Agency   Capture   During  
Regulatory   Policymaking.”   in   Daniel   Carpenter   and   David  
Moss (Eds.), Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest 
Influence, and How to Limit It (forthcoming) 
13 Krawiec,   K.   (2011).   ‘Don’t   “Screw   Joe   The   Plummer”:   The  
Sausage-Making of   Financial Reform. Working Paper, 
09/2011, available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2445/.  
14 See Ayres, I. and J. Braithwaite (1991).   ‘Tripartism:    
Regulatory  Capture  and  Empowerment’,  Law & Social Inquiry, 
16(3): 435-96. and Ayres, I. and J. Braithwaite (1992). 
Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation 
Debate. New York. Oxford University Press 
15 Schwarcz, D. (2012). ‘Preventing   Capture   Through  
Consumer Empowerment Programs:  Some Evidence from 
Insurance   Regulation.’   Draft   chapter   (as   of   28.10.11)   in:  
Carpenter, D. and D. Moss, eds (forthcoming). Preventing 
Regulatory Capture:  Special Interest Influence in Regulation 
and How to Limit It. 
4. External checks 
 
Various external checks surround the modern 
regulatory process, some more effective than 
others. The media can cast light on the process 
and generate public review. Congressional 
committees and inspectors general often engage 
in far-reaching investigations of the actions of the 
financial regulators, sometimes with very critical 
effect. Some judges, too, have strongly criticized 
the leniency of agencies in settlements with the 
industry, as was most recently demonstrated by 
Judge  Rakoff’s  rejection  of  two  settlements  by  the  
SEC against Bank of America and Citigroup. (Judge 
Rakoff’s  decision to reject the Citi settlement has 
been remanded by the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeal for having gone too far.) Perhaps there is 
greater scope for judicial checks on the excessive 
influence of particular stakeholders, though this 
check remains limited and highly dependent on 
the specific nature of disputes16. Finally, as already 
noted, the agencies themselves are sometimes at 
odds with each other in ways that enrich the 
public debate, necessary to promote sound policy 
outcomes. 
 
These traditional checks seem inadequate to 
ensure a balance of interests because so many 
regulatory decisions, from emergency lending by 
the Fed to daily regulatory sanctions or approvals, 
go unnoticed. Furthermore, when it comes to 
complex and highly technical rulemaking, the 
relative expertise of interested parties can be 
extremely lopsided, with industry representatives 
having by far the greater knowledge and 
understanding of the issues and, as a result, 
effectiveness of comment in the rulemaking 
process. Groups of independent experts are not 
well organized into coherent committees capable 
of providing sufficient balance to the cacophony 
of pro- or anti-industry views17.  
 
                                                 
16 Magill,  E.  M.  (2012).  ‘Courts  and  Regulatory  Capture’,  Draft  
chapter (as of 11.29.11, cited with permission) in: Carpenter, 
D. and D. Moss, eds (forthcoming). Preventing Regulatory 
Capture: Special Interest Influence in Regulation and How to 
Limit It. 
17 Balleisen,   E.   (2011).   ‘The   Global   Financial   Crisis   and  
Responsive  Regulation:    Some  Avenues  for  Historical  Inquiry’,  
University of British Columbia Law Review, 44(3): 557-87. 
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This imbalance seems likely to distort how the 
agency perceives the issues and interprets its 
empowering legislation, even if there might in fact 
be alternative views just as important yet 
inarticulately held by stakeholders who lack the 
basic competence to represent them. 
 
Such shortcomings in the representative process 
have led to various suggestions for new external 
checks on the regulatory process. The author has 
proposed a self-funding and independent 
consulting organization that would have to be 
consulted on key issues of regulatory 
policymaking. An example of such a model in the 
US is the MITRE organization which is primarily 
focused on military contracting but which has 
indeed sometimes provided advice to financial 
agencies18. 
 
A much broader proposal is that of an agency or 
“Sentinel”   that   would   have   power   to   demand  
information, have expertise to evaluate this 
information and the financial policies being 
adopted by the agencies, and have the 
responsibility to report its views to Congress and 
the executive branch. With purview over the 
whole financial system, the Sentinel would bring a 
broader perspective to bear than might otherwise 
be held by the specific agency whose action is 
under review. Being independently funded and 
situated, the Sentinel would also be in a position 
to offer impartial views as between the various 
financial agencies19. 
 
Another broad proposal   is   a   ‘Public   Interest  
Council’   that   would   consist   of   an   expert  
independent government agency appointed by 
Congress and located outside the executive 
branch, charged with participating in the 
regulatory   process   ‘as   the   designated  
representative of the public interest in preserving 
long-term financial stability and minimizing 
                                                 
18 Baxter,   L.   G.   (2011).   ‘   “Capture”   in   Financial   Regulation:  
Can   We   Channel   it   Toward   the   Common   Good?’   Cornell 
Journal of Law and Public Policy, 21(1): 175-200. 
19 See Barth, J. R., G. Caprio Jr. and R. Levine (2012). 
Guardians of Finance: Making Regulators Work for Us, 
Cambridge & London, MIT Press and Levine, R. (2010).   ‘The  
governance of financial regulation: reform lessons from the 
recent  crisis.’  BIS  Working  Paper  329. 
systemic  risk’.  Like  the  Sentinel,  the  Council  would  
possess neither legislative nor executive powers; it 
would, however, have wide authority to collect 
information from both government agencies and 
private market participants, conduct 
investigations, publicize its findings and advise 
Congress   and   regulators   to   take   action   ‘with  
respect  to  issues  of  public  concern’20. 
 
The difficulty with each of these ideas is that they 
are predicated on a substantive public interest 
that can be identified in some detached way by 
experts. Yet it is unlikely that any of the agents in 
the process would acknowledge or even perceive 
that their positions were not in fact the best ones 
for the public interest, and it is has become naive 
to expect otherwise. As one critic of the Sentinel 
idea   has   put   it,   ‘it   is   misleading   to   suggest   that  
these [regulatory] judgements do not have a 
strong political dimension to them. They cannot 
be put on autopilot, or entrusted to a group of 
disinterested   “wise   men”’21. Proposing the 
addition of new layers to the regulatory process is 
also a questionable strategy, politically and 
financially. The regulators tend to under-
resourced as it is, and regulatory burden in 
financial services has become a rallying cry for the 
industry, sometimes with good reason.  In the 
United States at least, proposing to allocate yet 
more funds to yet more external public agencies 
would   have   little   prospect   of   success   in   today’s  
Congress. 
 
Another promising and potentially meaningful 
check, however, is also emerging in the United 
States, following similar developments in the 
United Kingdom. This is a cadre of privately 
funded and diverse expert organizations akin to 
the   “shadow   banking   committee”   that played a 
prominent role in critique of financial regulatory 
policy in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The original shadow banking committee is now 
known as the Shadow Financial Regulatory 
                                                 
20 Omarova,   S.T.   (2012).   ‘Bankers,   Bureaucrats,   and  
Guardians: Toward Tripartism in Financial Services 
Regulation.’  Journal of Corporation Law, 37, forthcoming 
21 Davies,  H.  (2010).    ‘Comments  on  Ross  Levine’s  Paper  “The  
governance of financial regulation:  reform lessons from the 
recent  crisis.”  ’  BIS  Working  Paper  329. 
 
Baxter – An Academic Perspective from the United States 
 
                                
39 The Making of Good Financial Regulation 
 
Committee, an independent committee sponsored 
by the American Enterprise Institute. Additional 
examples are the Centre for Economic Policy 
Research, PublicCitizen, new deal 2.0, Project on 
Government Oversight (POGO) and Americans for 
Financial Reform.   
 
In another chapter in this book, Christine Farnish, 
chair of Consumer Focus, describes the experience 
in the United Kingdom of such initiatives and their 
potential for promoting more effective consumer 
input on financial regulation. Bodies like these are 
independent of the industry itself and presumably 
reflect independent perspectives and 
accumulating financial expertise. One might 
anticipate that such organizations will develop the 
capability of providing extensive expert input into 
the regulatory process, with the muscle to assure 
public coverage and regulatory and congressional 
attention.  
 
5. Internal checks 
 
One of the most effective means of restoring 
equilibrium in interests in financial services is not 
external checks and balances, but internal change 
within the industry itself. This might be through 
cultural change, perhaps a return to a more 
restrained approach to market competition, away 
from the trading culture and back to advisory 
professionalism. A frequently heard lament is for 
the days before Goldman Sachs became a public 
company, when the investment banking culture 
was dominant and personal liability more real. 
Viewed in this light the emphasis on increased 
capital levels – more skin in the game on the part 
of the owners of financial firms themselves and 
less   reliance   on   other   people’s   money   – 
represents an attempt to restore a greater sense 
of personal responsibility for risk-taking. 
 
There might also be other ways to adjust the 
internal attitudes of financial executives, such as 
changes to liability rules. For example, fiduciary 
duties can be extended to cover more genuine 
“clients”,   a   matter   on   which   the   SEC   presented  
recommendations for broker-dealers and 
investment advisers under the mandate of Section 
913 of the Dodd-Frank Act (SEC 2011) and which is 
fiercely resisted by industry groups. Elsewhere, I 
have argued that the fiduciary duty of the board 
and top executives, traditionally focused 
exclusively on shareholders, should to be adapted 
to reflect the fact that a critical third party, though 
not always recognized, is inevitably present in the 
boardroom, namely the public that subsidizes the 
industry so heavily.22 
 
These kinds of proposals tend to arouse great 
hostility from the industry, as we saw with the 
enactment of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act in 2002. Yet a vivid personal experience for me 
was the change in how fellow executives and I 
focused on financial reporting once we became 
aware that we were personally on the hook for 
their reliability. There is nothing like personal 
liability in the midst of great corporate brumes to 
focus the mind on what is important. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Capture in the somewhat quasi-public industry of 
financial services is quite chameleonic. It is the 
seemingly perverse result of an unavoidably close 
and intense interaction between regulators and 
the industry, yet it is hard to imagine a financial 
services industry free of the phenomenon. The 
complex interaction between regulators and 
industry makes it hard to solve the problems of 
distortive influence through any one technique; 
instead, a more effective approach – to deploy a 
cluster of rather traditional solutions – continues 
to be necessary. This hardly comes as a surprise, 
given the exceptionally complex nature of 
financial markets, their volatile and rapid 
evolution, and the complicated and often 
conflicting policies that we support.
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